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The interplay of social and strategic motivations in human interactions is a largely unexplored topic in collective
social phenomena. Whether individuals’ decisions are taken in a purely strategic basis or due to social pressure
without a rational background crucially influences the model outcome. Here we study a networked Prisoner’s
Dilemma in which decisions are made either based on the replication of the most successful neighbor’s strategy
(unconditional imitation) or by pure social imitation following an update rule inspired by the voter model. The
main effects of the voter dynamics are an enhancement of the final consensus, i.e., asymptotic states are generally
uniform, and a promotion of cooperation in certain regions of the parameter space as compared to the outcome of
purely strategic updates. Thus, voter dynamics acts as an interface noise and has a similar effect as a pure random
noise; furthermore, its influence is mostly independent of the network heterogeneity. When strategic decisions
are made following other update rules such as the replicator or Moran processes, the dynamic mixed state found
under unconditional imitation for some parameters disappears, but an increase of cooperation in certain parameter
regions is still observed. Comparing our results with recent experiments on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we conclude
that such a mixed dynamics may explain moody conditional cooperation among the agents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Collective social phenomena arise from the interactions
of individuals, which are considered the elementary units of
social structures [1]. Related phenomena include strategic
interactions, opinion and cultural dynamics, epidemic and
rumor spreading, and so on. In many of these problems, the
dynamics is not uniquely defined as in a Hamiltonian system,
and it is often the case that social contexts can evolve in time
in many different manners [2]. This is particularly relevant
in strategic interactions, in which people take into account
their expectations about what their partners might choose to
do [3,4].
A specific and socially important problem where the
dynamics leads to very different outcomes is the emergence
of cooperation [5–8]. Indeed, the spreading and prosperity
of cooperative behaviors, often observed in human societies
despite its disadvantage in terms of the fitness of single
individuals, has been a central topic in evolutionary dynamics,
economics, sociology, and psychology for years. Several
models, mechanisms, and ideas have been suggested in order to
explain the emergence and the stability of cooperation [9–11],
particularly in games where cooperation is costly, such as
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). One such mechanism is the
so-called network reciprocity, which was first proposed by
Nowak and May [12]. They showed that if the PD is played on
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a lattice, frozen configurations can appear, where cooperators
have survived and even overwhelmed defectors. Subsequent
research established that the effect of the topology is not
universal [13] (see, also, [14] for a recent review) and that
the enhancement of the cooperative strategies depends on
the network properties, the dynamical update rule, the exact
entries of the payoff matrix, the size of the system, and the
time structure [15–21]. The theoretical discussion was finally
settled by several experiments [22–26], which established that
networks did not exhibit a cooperation level significantly
higher than a well-mixed population. Interestingly, those
experimental works allow one to conclude that most of the
update rules that have been used in analytical or numerical
studies of the evolutionary PD are not used by actual people
when playing the game, and therefore other dynamics must be
considered.
In this paper, we propose an evolutionary update rule
that combines strategic thinking with imitation of a more
social character, and study how it affects the outcome of the
networked PD. Indeed, it has been noticed that in the real
world, a key point is that people do not reach a decision
only on the basis of strategic reasoning, but also consider the
social pressure of their environment, with the possibility of
making mistakes [27,28]. The first and most common way
for an individual to follow social pressure is to imitate a
neighbor’s act or opinion without any strategic considerations.
To represent this, in a previous work [29] we introduced a
model where agents can evolve by a mixed dynamics of pure
and strategic imitation in a coordination game, finding that
such mixing makes possible that the system orders in one of
the two absorbing states in situations in which neither the pure
coordination game nor the voter model reach consensus. Our
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aim here is to broaden the topic by studying what happens
when pure imitation acts together with strategic dynamics
on the PD, verifying if also in this case the nonstrategic
behavior leads to a more convenient final configuration for
the whole society. In addition, we will compare our results to
the available experimental evidence, drawing conclusions as
to the relevance of the proposed dynamics to the real world.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II, we present
in detail our model and the rationale behind its definition.
Section III deals with the numerical results obtained in two
relevant systems, namely, random (Erdo¨s-Re´nyi, ER) and scale
free (SF) networks. Subsequently, in Sec. IV, we analyze how
the system outcome changes when other update dynamics are
used in the strategic decisions. Section V discusses our work
in light of the experiments and, finally, Sec. VI summarizes
our main findings.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Our model consists of a system of N agents on a network,
which for the purpose of this work will be either Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
or random SF (generated with the configurational model) as
paradigmatic examples to explore the effects of heterogeneity
in the number of connections. Additionally, experiments on
the behavior of human subjects have been carried out on the
same type of inhomogeneous networks [25], which facilitates
the comparison between our results and the experimental ones.
Each agent interacts directly only with her nearest neighbors
in the network, and can choose among two possible actions,
represented by a two-valued integer variable (“action”) s =
±1. We identify the positive value with cooperation (C) and
the negative one with defection (D). Individuals interact in
a PD, i.e., they play with their neighbors and then collect a
payoff according to the action adopted by themselves and their
opponents. Payoffs are collected according to the following
payoff matrix:
C D
C 1 0
D T ε
(1)
where the punishment parameter ε must fall in the interval
[0,1) and T > 1 to ensure that the game is a PD. Without loss
of generality, we set T = 1.4 and vary ε in our simulations.
Note that this is not the usual way to work with the PD in
most papers, as typically ε is set to 0 and the payoff to C
vs D is in a range of zero or negative values. The reason
for this particular choice is to facilitate the interpretation of
our results in light of an earlier work of ours on symmetric
coordination games [29], given by the same payoff matrix as
in Eq. (1) with T = 0 and  = 1. In the game considered
here, it is well known that the rational choice is always
to defect, not only to prevent betrayals by other players
but also because it always gives a higher payoff no matter
what the other player does (in economic terms, it is a Nash
equilibrium [4]). However, it is also clear that the global gain
would be higher if both agents cooperate, and herein lies the
dilemma.
Having defined our strategic context, we now turn to
the dynamics. After every interaction, an individual updates
her strategy simply imitating a neighbor at random, that is,
following the voter model (VM) dynamics with probability
q. Otherwise, with probability 1 − q, an update rule based
on the actual fitness attained by herself and her neighbors
is implemented. For the main part of the paper, we will
use unconditional imitation (UI) as the strategic update rule.
With UI, at the end of each round of the game, every player
imitates the strategy of the neighbor that has obtained the
best payoff provided it is larger than her own. This update
rule was introduced in [12] as a simple way to implement
the interest of a (rational) agent to maximize her own fitness
and to reach that end by imitating the most successful
individuals. It is important to note that there are other strategic
imitation rules that could be considered, some of which are
discussed in Sec. IV below as alternatives to our main model.
Experimental results, however, show that UI might resemble
the actions of the players in real life, provided they do
not stick to the update rule all the time [24,26]. This is a
further motivation to consider a mixed dynamics as we are
proposing here. On the other hand, regarding the VM, in spite
of its simplicity it has been shown to capture some features
of the way people behave in, e.g., electoral processes [30]
and therefore it is a very suitable method to introduce the
mechanisms of social imitation into an otherwise strategic
problem.
For reference, it is useful to recall what the effects are of
either of our dynamics when acting alone. In high dimensional
lattices (d  3) and random networks, the VM dynamics
drives the system to a disordered active state, whose proportion
of opinions (in our case, actions) is given by the initial con-
ditions [1,31]. This state is dynamic in the ensemble average;
the opinion of the agents keeps changing along time. In finite
systems, the fluctuations will eventually drive the system to
consensus, which is an absorbing state. The characteristic time
to reach consensus grows with system size N , diverging in
the limit N → ∞. As for the strategic dynamics, which in
mean-field PD ends up in a consensus (frozen) state with all
defectors regardless of the update rule, in complex topologies
it is possible that some cooperators survive, even though this
effect is not universal and the final state depends sensitively
on an entire set of different parameters. A full summary of the
different outcomes can be found in Ref. [14]. For our basic
rule, UI, the outcome of the evolution on random networks is,
in general, also full defection, but in a small parameter region
around ε = 0 cooperation prevails, the more so with the lower
the degree of the network. Such promotion of cooperation
in a bounded range of parameters takes place as well for
scale free networks, although in this case the cooperative
region is smaller than for random networks. Note, however,
that (whether ordered or disordered) the final outcome of the
system on the random networks with strategic rules is, in
general, a frozen state, where no player changes her decision
anymore. Finally, it is also interesting to mention what happens
when the interaction is given by a coordination game [29]. In
this case, as explained, the final outcome of either rule (VM
or UI) alone is a disordered state, active or frozen, but the mix
of both UI and VM completely changes the scenario because
the system tends to consensus either rapidly when the VM is
dominant or slowly when it acts as a noise over the gamelike
evolution.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Final active bonds density (top) and co-
operator density (bottom) as a function of the dynamics mixing
parameter q and the punishment ε for a system on an ER random
network of size N = 3000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 8.48. Caveat:
the interval of parameter space investigated is (ε,q) ∈ [0,0.5] × (0,1);
notice that q = 0 and q = 1 are excluded.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We begin the report of our numerical results by checking
whether the mixing of the two dynamics influences how the
system reaches the final state, and the nature of the final state
itself. Unless otherwise stated, we will be presenting results
averaged over 1000 system realizations. Figure 1 summarizes
our results for an ER random network with 〈k〉 = 8.48. In the
top plot, the final value of the active link density is shown as a
function of the punishment and of the mixing parameter. The
active link density is the fraction of links connecting nodes
with opposite strategies. In the case of VM dynamics, these
links are susceptible to further updates. As can be seen in
the bottom panel, for a majority of parameter choices, the
system becomes frozen in a consensus state (either all C or
D). Nevertheless, there exists a parameter region in which
the fate of the system is not frozen but is a dynamic state.
As mentioned above, this is not the case when the game is
of coordination, and therefore it is a different phenomenon
arising for the PD. This region corresponds to low values of
ε, meaning that the incentive to defect is relatively small, and
high values of q, i.e., large probability of imitating a neighbor
at random (VM). Therefore, the dynamics is such that as the
transition from cooperator to defector is relatively slow due to
the strategic update, there remains a pool of cooperators than
can be socially copied and thus an overall intermediate level of
cooperation is maintained. In the regions where full consensus
is reached, the cooperator density in the plot is actually the
probability that the final configuration of a realization is a full
C state. An interesting feature demonstrated by these plots is
that cooperation is enhanced with respect to the classical mean-
field case and, although the comparison is not straightforward
due to the different parametrization, it is also enhanced when
compared with pure UI dynamics on a random network.
As these results are obtained for a specific type of networks,
it is important to check their generality if the average degree
or the full network topology is changed. For comparison,
Fig. 2 presents the final value of the active link density and
the cooperator density for an ER random network and for a
scale free network of average degree 〈k〉 = 5.14. It can be
seen that decreasing the number of neighbors leads to an
expansion of the region where cooperation is observed, in
agreement with what takes place with UI dynamics only; as
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FIG. 2. (Color online) (a),(b) Final active bonds density and (c),(d) cooperator density as a function of the mixing parameter q and ε for a
system on networks of size N = 3000. The network is (a),(c) an ER and (b),(d) scale free, with average degree 〈k〉 = 5.14. Caveat: the interval
of parameter space investigated is (ε,q) ∈ [0,0.5] × (0,1); notice that q = 0 and q = 1 are excluded.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Time evolution of the average active links
for a system on networks of size N = 3000; (a),(c) a random network
and (b),(d) a scale free network, both with 〈k〉 = 5.14. (a),(b) Low
value of ε; (c), (d) higher punishment parameter. In each subfigure,
the curve with the smallest value of q decays as a power law; the other
curves (a) stay on a plateau and (c),(d) decay exponentially; (b) the
curve for q = 0.7 remains on a plateau, while the one for q = 0.95
finally decays exponentially.
the number of neighbors decreases, it becomes more likely to
imitate a cooperator and the network may be driven towards
full cooperation. On the contrary, the case of the scale free
network behaves differently: adding more heterogeneity to
the network leads to a slightly larger region of cooperative
behavior and, at the same time, to a smaller region where
the dynamics leads to an active state. However, the general
conclusion one can draw from these plots is that the network
properties, at least in the class of uncorrelated networks that
we are looking at, do not affect the outcome of the mixed
dynamics very much.
Let us focus now on the details of the time evolution of the
system. Figure 3 shows examples of the behavior of the average
active links density in a system evolving on a random or on a
scale free network for different values of the punishment ε. For
larger values of the punishment, we find that the system always
reaches a consensus state, following an exponential decay for
high values of q, and a power-law-like decay for small values of
the mixing parameter. This behavior is qualitatively the same
in both types of networks, and it is in good agreement with the
results of the model studied in [29], where players interacted
through a coordination game. When the punishment is small,
for small q the system still reaches a consensus state. However,
for higher q it ends up in a dynamic state. It is interesting to
stress that for the q values chosen in the case of the scale
free network, convergence to consensus or an active mixed
state is in fact a reentrant phenomenon, as was expected from
the results in Fig. 2. The fact that the system reaches a real
active final state is proven in Fig. 4, where the time needed
to reach consensus, τ , is shown to diverge exponentially with
the system size. In the thermodynamic limit, the system never
orders.
To gain further insight into the properties of the final state,
we check whether or not cooperation is promoted by the
influence of the VM dynamics. The final cooperator density
FIG. 4. (Color online) Dependence of the time needed to reach
the final state τ as a function of the system size N . Operatively, τ
was measured as the time when the active link density dropped below
0.07. The networks have a (a) random or (b) scale free topology
with average degree 〈k〉 = 5.14. The punishment has been set at
ε = 0.05 and q = 0.5 and 0.7, respectively. In the exponential fits τ ∼
exp(γN ), we have estimated γ  0.0032 ± 0.0008 for the random
networks and γ  0.0038 ± 0.0001 for the scale free networks.
is shown in Fig. 5 as a function of q for ε = 0.05. The aim is
to provide a clearer picture than the general phase diagrams
(ε,q) discussed above. Even though in the absence of any
other model contribution (q = 0) the cooperation is already
promoted (as compared to mean field) due to topological
effects [14], we can notice how initially the mixing of dynamics
actually enhances cooperation compared with the case of
pure PD game. Subsequently, upon increasing q, the final
cooperator density begins its decay towards zero (not shown),
apart from the singular limit at q = 1 where, as already stated,
only the voter dynamics is acting and the system remains in
an active disordered state (more precisely, the limit of n∞c for
q → 1− is zero, but an infinite time is needed to reach it). Once
again, the behavior is similar on the two types of networks
studied. This is reminiscent of the promotion of cooperation
due to random noise (or mutation) analyzed in [32]. However,
the two models are different because in the case of [32], noise
acted upon any network node through a random change in the
current action of the player. On the contrary, what we have
here is interfacial noise because it only acts through imitation
of neighbors who are playing a different action. Therefore,
the noise introduced by the VM does not act on players who
are completely surrounded by others with their same action.
However, we do observe that an appropriate amount of the VM
leads to an increase of the cooperation.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Final cooperator density for a system on a
(a) random or (b) scale free network of size N = 3000 and average
degree 〈k〉 = 5.14. The punishment parameter is ε = 0.05. q = 0
means a purely strategy update of the PD; note that there is a slight
increase of n∞c as soon as q becomes larger than zero.
022810-4
SOCIAL IMITATION VERSUS STRATEGIC CHOICE, OR . . . PHYSICAL REVIEW E 90, 022810 (2014)
0 200 400 600 800 100010
-3
10-2
10-1
100
n a
(t)
q = 0.1
q = 0.6
q = 0.9
(a)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
t
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
n a
(t)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
10-2
10-1
100
(b)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
t
10-2
10-1
100
ε = 0.1 ε = 0.1
ε = 0.4 ε = 0.4
FIG. 6. (Color online) Time evolution of average active links
for a system on a random network of size N = 3000 and average
degree 〈k〉 = 8.48 with punishment ε = 0.1 (top figures), and ε = 0.4
(bottom figures). Column (a): REP update rule. Column (b): MOR
update rule.
IV. OTHER UPDATE RULES
To complete our study and enlarge the understanding
of the combined effects of social imitation and strategic
dynamics, we will now consider two additional dynamics,
namely, replicator (REP) and Moran (MOR) rules. With REP,
agents chooses a neighbor at random: if the payoff of the
chosen neighbor is lower than the agent’s own payoff, nothing
changes, but if it is larger, the agent will adopt the neighbor’s
strategy with a probability proportional to the difference
between the two payoffs. On the other hand, with MOR, agents
choose one of their neighbors with probability proportional to
their payoff, without considering whether it is larger than theirs
or not. We chose these two rules because they complement
our study of UI: indeed, UI is a local deterministic rule (an
agent watches all of her neighborhood and the evolution is
completely predetermined by the rule), REP is pairwise and
stochastic (an agent decides how to evolve watching only
one neighbor at a time, and the result of the evolution is
not univocally determined), and MOR is local and stochastic.
Moreover, MOR allows the individuals to make mistakes (there
is a nonzero probability to imitate a neighbor with worse
fitness). In fact, MOR can be understood as a weighted social
imitation, where the weight is the success of the individual
observed. We stress, however, that these two rules have not
been observed in experiments and therefore their interest
here arises from the viewpoint of the understanding of the
mechanisms of the mixed dynamics.
The first important difference when the update rule changes
is the disappearance of the final active state for any value of
the parameters. In all of the (ε,q) phase space, the behavior is
always as in the examples depicted in Fig. 6: the active link
density vanishes and a final consensus is reached, with all the
network choosing the same action (either C or D). Moreover,
the decay in all cases is exponential, pointing to the power-law
behavior observed with UI as a specificity of that algorithm. In
practice, what we find is that the stochasticity of the strategic
evolution algorithm speeds up the dynamics and helps the
system always reach final consensus, whereas the pairwise or
local character of the rule is less relevant.
As with the UI strategic dynamics, the type of network
considered (within the broad class of uncorrelated networks of
high dimensionality) is not relevant, in particular with regard to
the final configuration. The MOR rule enhances cooperation
with respect to REP, as shown in Fig. 7, and this increase
is always somewhat larger in scale free networks. It can be
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Final cooperator density as a function of q and ε for a system on (a),(c) a random or (b),(d) scale free network of
size N = 3000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 8.48 and 〈k〉 = 5.14, respectively. (a),(b): REP update rule; (c),(d): MOR update rule. Caveat: the
interval of parameter space investigated is (ε,q) ∈ [0,0.5] × (0,1); notice that q = 0 and q = 1 are excluded.
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Final cooperator density for a system on
a random network of size N = 3000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 8.48.
The punishment parameter is ε = 0.10. (a) REP update rule, (b) MOR
rule. Note that since the final configuration is static, n∞c corresponds
to the fraction of realizations ending in full cooperation.
noticed that while for REP the final cooperator density drops
rapidly with increasing q, for agents evolving with the Moran
rule the final cooperator density falls more slowly and in a
longer range of q values (Fig. 8). In practice, while with the
MOR rule inserting nonstrategic imitation slightly enhances
(or at least does not hinder) cooperation just as with UI,
when we have REP the voter dynamics appears to hamper
the spreading of the cooperative strategy. As indicated above,
MOR can be seen as a generalized voter, and the result is that
the dynamics is similar in the sense that it leads with similar
probability to any of the two possible outcomes. The final
system aftermath is slightly biased towards the equilibrium,
but, interestingly, always in a frozen configuration, which does
not occur with VM alone. Finally, it is clear that in both cases,
there is only a weak dependence on ε.
V. DISCUSSION
So far, we have studied the combination of strategic and
social imitation dynamics as the driver for evolution in a
networked PD. We have thus learned that when strategic
updates obey the UI rule, the mixing of dynamics helps the
system to reach consensus in an all C or D configuration. Note
that for certain values of the parameters, the final state is full
cooperation, which is not an equilibrium of the underlying
game. Furthermore, there is a small parameter region (high q
and low ε) where the final fate of the system is a dynamic state
with a fraction of cooperators and defectors.
In view of these results, a first question arises as to whether
some analytical explanation of those observations is possible.
Unfortunately, the approach used for this purpose in [29] does
not work here due to the strongly different nature of the two
games: VM and PD do not have the same equilibria as VM and
the coordination game. Indeed, the outcome of the evolution
for the coordination game is always a Nash equilibrium, and
when the PD converges to full cooperation, it is not. There
is, however, a possibility to address the issue in a limited
parameter regime by considering a random walk in a weighted
directed network. It is known that the convergence time of
the voter model has the same distribution as the convergence
time of the coalescing random walk process to a single particle
[33–35], which in its turn is related to the mean first passage
time (MFPT) of a single walker [36]. Then, for q = 1 (i.e.,
pure VM dynamics), our problem is exactly that of the random
walk on complex networks. On the other hand, for q < 1,
because of the evolutionary rules, the agents with higher fitness
can be seen as nodes where the probability of a walker to fall
into them increases and, at the same time, it becomes more
difficult to escape from them. Now, for an undirected network,
the MFPT from whatever starting point to an arrival node j ,
τuj is [36,37]
τuj =
D
∑
l Alj
, (2)
where Alj is the adjacency matrix, which includes the weight
of each link, and D is an appropriate constant. Considering a
situation with a mixing parameter q close to one, let us say, q =
1 − η with η small enough, the MFPT can be approximated by
τj = τuj + αj (η), (3)
where αj should be a suitable perturbation depending on η and
on the node j . Then, if j is occupied by an individual with the
best fitness of all her neighborhood and having in mind that the
strategic evolution is UI, no walker will ever reach node j , i.e.,
αj → ∞, then also τj diverges. For the other rules we have
checked, with the MOR rule, αj always remains finite, whereas
with the REP rule, the system behaves, in principle, like UI,
but since it considerably hinders cooperation after relatively
few time steps, it is easy for the finite system to undergo a
fluctuation (due to the voter dynamics) which lets it land at
the all-defectors consensus. Of course, such argument is only
qualitative and does not fully explain what goes on with the
dynamics for every value of q close to 1, but at least it provides
some justification of our observations under a UI update rule.
Beyond finding analytical insights into our results, the
other important topic that requires discussion is the relation of
this dynamics with experiments. The experiments on square
lattices [24,26] or on heterogeneous networks [25] show
that subjects behave in a way that has been called moody
conditional cooperation (MCC). This means that the action
they take depends on the number of cooperating neighbors
they had in the previous round: the more neighbors cooperated,
the more likely it is that the player cooperates. However, the
choice depends also on the player’s own previous action: thus,
it has been shown that cooperation following cooperation
is much more likely than following defection. We have
therefore checked whether the dynamics of our simulations is
compatible with this observation. To this end, we looked at the
probability of cooperation of an agent as a function of her last
action and depending on the fraction of cooperating neighbors
the last time she was selected to play a round. Also, in order to
get better statistics and compare the results, we consider three
ranges of cooperation contexts: when less than one-third of the
neighbors cooperated, when more than two-thirds cooperated,
and the intermediate case. We then estimate the probabilities
of cooperation by looking at the frequencies with which the
corresponding actions are chosen.
Our results are shown in Fig. 9, where it can be seen that
we indeed observe a behavior of the agents reminiscent of the
experimental observations. Indeed, we see that after defecting,
the probability to cooperate in the next round is low and not
very dependent on the context, while after cooperating, there
is an almost linear dependence of the probability to cooperate
again on the number of neighboring cooperators, as reported
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FIG. 9. (Color online) Evidence for moody conditional cooper-
ation on systems given by (a),(c) a random network and (b),(d) a
scale free network, of size N = 3000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 5.14.
(a),(b) Frequency of cooperation after defection as a function of the
fraction of cooperating neighbors (see text) in the previous round.
(c),(d) Frequency of cooperation after cooperation as a function of
the fraction of cooperating neighbors in the previous round. Note
that the histograms are similar regardless of the network topology.
The payoff matrix is the same as in [24] for comparison, with ε = 0,
T = 1.4, and the payoff to a cooperator facing a defector vanishing
as well; UI update rule.
in the experiments [24–26]. Moreover, again in accordance
with experiments, there is no dependence on the topology.
The simulation has been done with a value of q = 0.3, which
we have chosen seeing that in the experimental data, if there
is any imitation of the best neighbor, it happens at most in
around 70% of the cases. However, it is important to stress
that these measurements are carried out during the transient
phase: as we already stated, for most of the parameter space
the final state of the system is either full cooperation or
full defection, and in particular for payoff values similar
to those used in the experiments, the system converges to
full cooperation (see Fig. 10). This is not in agreement
with the experimental observations, where, if there is indeed
convergence to a homogeneous state, it is very slow and
much more likely towards full defection. In previous works
[29,38], we have observed a much slower dynamics for the
cooperation fraction, but this was associated with other type
of games or more involved opinion models. On the other hand,
we have checked that the same behavior arises for a very
wide range of values of q and ε, and hence in this sense
the relation between moody conditional cooperation and our
mixed dynamics is quite robust. In any event, we stress that
such mixing of dynamics is not a necessary condition to
get MCC behavior, but is a sufficient one. Therefore, while
there are alternative explanations for the observed behavior in
terms of players’ learning [39], we believe that the fact that
the outcome of our simulations mixing social and strategic
imitation is not far, in behavioral terms, from the experimental
results warrants further research to clarify the explanatory
power of this mechanism or similar ones. In this respect,
the observed lack of qualitative dependence of the agents’
behavior on specific properties of a high dimensional network
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Time evolution of the fractions of coop-
erators and active links on a scale free network of size N = 3000 and
average degree 〈k〉 = 5.14. The payoff matrix is the same as in [24]
for comparison, with ε = 0, T = 1.4, and the payoff to a cooperator
facing a defector vanishing as well; UI update rule.
where the game takes place, which is another feature in which
both our simulations and experiments coincide, makes such a
study even more appealing.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have provided evidence that social
imitation dynamics, added to strategic update rules driving
the evolution of players’ actions in a PD, leads to consensus.
In addition, in an ample range of parameters, the selected
consensus is cooperative, even if it is not a Nash equilibrium of
the game. In this manner, social imitation given by a VM-like
dynamics helps the individuals of a complex society adopt
the most convenient behavior without being influenced by the
risks involved in such a choice, again, at least for punishments
that are not too large. It is important to realize that reaching
cooperative outcomes is a product of our mixed dynamics and
of the existence of a network, as in a well-mixed population
the consensus is always to full defection. The appearance
of full cooperation takes place when the punishment ε for
mutual defection is small, as in this case cooperation is not
an equilibrium but is not very far from it, and in that situation
social imitation of defectors is not fast enough to induce the
other consensus. We also want to stress that this is a general
effect, not limited to the PD, as our earlier study [29] on
the totally symmetric coordination game with unconditional
imitation shows. Interestingly, in contrast to what takes place
in the coordination game, for largeq and small ε, the networked
PD remains in a disordered dynamic state stable in the
large-size limit and which, in turn, appears to be independent
of the topology, at least as far as the heterogeneity of the
network is concerned. Moreover, with the UI update rule, as
in the coordination game we also observe the existence of
two regimes in the time evolution towards consensus: power
law when q (the probability of social imitation) is small,
and then the main driver of the agents’ decision is strategic,
and exponential, when q → 1. In this last case, the system
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initially behaves according to a pure voter dynamics, reaching
a state that is very close to the final configuration of the
voter model. Only after a characteristic time t∗(q) is that
configuration, in turn, affected by the action of the strategic
rule, ending up in a frozen configuration, with the exception of
the region mentioned above. Naturally, such t∗(q) diverges for
q approaching to 1, where only the voter model regime is left.
On the other hand, with REP and MOR, only an exponential
decay can be observed (Fig. 6), for every ε and q.
We have also extended our study to other strategic dynamics
in order to assess the mechanisms behind our observations.
To that end, we have implemented REP, which copies a
neighboring agent’s action if it led to a better payoff than that of
the focal agent, and MOR, which copies a neighboring agent’s
action with probability proportional to her payoff, and can
make mistakes choosing less profitable actions. By comparing
these update rules with UI, given by imitation of the best-
performing neighbor, we conclude that only if the strategic
imitation takes into account the whole neighborhood can
the payoff-increasing cooperation arise with some generality.
Indeed, with the REP rule, consensus to cooperation is the
outcome in at most 15% of the realizations, where the
asymptotics of MOR is almost random (somewhat biased
towards defection) as it is a combination of two bounded
rationality imitation rules. Another particular result of UI
dynamics is the regime in which the system remains in an
active state, as with the other two dynamics the final outcome
is always full consensus and a frozen configuration.
It is worth recalling that other researchers have already
dealt with models of PD whose dynamics change by tuning
a parameter. For example, in [40], the behavior of the game
on different topologies is studied as a function of selection
pressure, from neutral evolution to pure imitation, while
in [41], the robustness of the outcomes of weak selection
dynamics in well-mixed populations is analyzed when se-
lection becomes intermediate or strong. There are interesting
transitions also in these cases, but we must stress that our study
is deeply different: indeed, here the varying parameter is the
weight of the VM dynamics, which cannot be considered as a
simple noise since it produces correlations in the system [29].
Moreover, at variance with Ref. [41], it acts on interfaces, that
is, it can work only between agents of opposite opinion.
To conclude in a more general tone, we have found that the
mechanism of combined social and strategic imitation is a very
powerful one to drive the system towards full consensus, even
if the so reached frozen configuration is not an equilibrium of
the game, as we have seen in this paper. We note that such
mechanism does not necessarily lead to desirable states such
as cooperation in a networked PD: this is only observed under
suitable parameters (in particular, a not too stringent dilemma)
and with a “greedy” strategic rule such as UI. Otherwise, social
imitation leads, in the case of the PD, to less cooperation
than pure strategic behavior. We have also noted that social
imitation is not a mutation-type noise, but rather it behaves
as interfacial noise as it only acts on active links, where a
cooperator and a defector are connected. As such noise, it
also leads to enhanced cooperation as compared to pure UI
on networks. Finally, we have seen that there are a number
of features of the experimental results on networked PDs that
are recovered from this model, and that a description of those
results in terms of transient configurations of our dynamics
would be possible. This suggests that our mechanism could
provide the basis for alternative explanations of the behavior
of human subjects in experiments.
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